In late April 2026, twenty 82nd Airborne Division paratroopers gathered at a training range near Fort Bragg for what the Army described as a first step — “Day One,” in the words of the lead acquisition officer — toward a capability the entire force will eventually need to master.

They spent two days building, flying, and operating first-person view drones in a drone-on-drone counter-UAS training environment. The system they were training on is a low-cost FPV interceptor designed to defeat hostile small unmanned systems through direct collision — a kinetic approach that addresses the cost-exchange problem that has made energy-based and missile counter-UAS systems difficult to scale at the unit level.

The training was run under the Pentagon’s Joint Interagency Task Force 401, the counter-drone task force stood up by Congress in the FY2026 NDAA. The system itself was funded under a $5.2 million agreement and delivered to the 82nd beginning in March 2026.

What Soldiers Actually Did

The training was not theoretical. Soldiers learned to build the drones, not just fly them. They ran crew drills, practiced target acquisition and intercept maneuvers, executed mission planning, and coordinated team roles — all modeled on tactics validated in operational environments, including lessons from Ukrainian frontline operators who developed FPV employment doctrine under live combat conditions.

Officials explicitly noted that future training iterations will include operations in electronically jammed environments — the realistic condition in which these systems will actually be employed.

That detail matters. A pilot who has only flown FPV under clean RF conditions is not prepared for the signal environment of a contested fight. Training against electronic warfare is not a supplemental skill. It is the baseline.

Why the Army Is Making This Investment

The tactical case is straightforward. Small commercial and modified FPV drones are cheap, available, and increasingly lethal. Units that cannot detect, track, and defeat them are at a disadvantage. Units that can employ them effectively have a capability that large-platform aviation cannot replicate at the required density or cost.

The acquisition logic follows. The Pentagon’s FY2027 budget request includes more than $70 billion for drones and counter-drone systems — the largest proposed investment in these capabilities in the department’s history. The goal stated by the JIATF-401 acquisition lead is to drive the cost of individual kinetic counter-UAS effectors “into the single digits of thousands” of dollars, making unit-level organic defeat capability financially sustainable at scale.

The training investment is the other side of that equation. Hardware purchased without trained operators is not a capability. The Army buying FPV interceptors without simultaneously building the operator base to employ them effectively is a procurement exercise, not a force modernization.

What This Means for Unit Training Officers

The Fort Bragg training event was described as a beginning, not a one-time demonstration. The Army’s doctrine directorate is actively updating FM 3-0, ATP 3-90.51, and ATP 3-01.81 to formally integrate small UAS employment and counter-small UAS tactics into force-wide doctrine — not as a specialized capability confined to dedicated units, but as a baseline competency expected at the infantry battalion and brigade level.

For training officers responsible for building those competencies in their formations, the question is timing. The doctrine is being written. The budgets are moving. The units that build operator proficiency ahead of the requirement becoming mandatory will have a material readiness advantage over those that wait.

The skills required are teachable and trainable — but they require structured progression, not just stick time. Building a proficient FPV operator means working through platform assembly, configuration, failure mode recognition, RF environment awareness, mission planning, and employment in degraded conditions. That curriculum cannot be improvised in garrison or acquired through commercial recreational flying.

The Training Stack

The capability demonstrated at Fort Bragg draws from the same skill set the Academy teaches across its platform integration, avionics, and RF curriculum:

  • Platform assembly and systems integration — understanding how an FPV drone is built, what fails and why, and how to repair it in the field
  • Flight proficiency and employment doctrine — manual FPV operation under operational conditions, not recreational flying
  • RF environment awareness — understanding the spectrum the system operates in, what degrades it, and how to recognize interference and jamming
  • Counter-UAS tactics — intercept geometry, team coordination, and crew roles under realistic threat conditions

None of those skills are acquired in a day. The units that are ahead of the curve built them progressively, with deliberate instruction.

The 82nd Airborne started that progression at Fort Bragg in April 2026. The rest of the force will follow.

Forge and Flight Academy offers the FFF-401 Advanced FPV Systems Integration & Field Sustainment course — a 10-day equipped program covering FPV platform construction, configuration, employment, and field sustainment. FFF-402 FPV Master Trainer Certification is available for operators who meet prerequisite requirements. Contact us to discuss cohort scheduling for your unit or organization.